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NO. 20676 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action arising out of construction of a 
manufacturing plant. Plaintiffs seek confirmation of an 
arbitration award and enforcement of a mechanics lien. 
Defendant, Otto Buehner & Company, seeks enforcement of its 
mechanics lien and damages in contract against Plaintiffs. 
Defendant, Joseph Smith Plumbing, seeks damages in contract 
against Plaintiffs. Defendants, C & A Enterprises and C & A 
Development Co. seek vacation of the arbitration award and 
Defendant, C & A Enterprises, seeks damages from Defendant, Otto 
Buehner & Company, for its negligence. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The arbitration award was confirmed on Plaintiffs' 
Motion. The District Court held that the cross-claim of C & A 
Enterprises against Otto Buehner & Company was barred by 
collateral estoppel. The mechanics lien of Otto Buehner & Company 
was granted but the lien of Plaintiffs was denied. Joseph Smith 
Plumbing was awarded damages in contract against Plaintiffs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants herein seek reversal of the judgment and 
remand to the District Court with instructions to vacate the 
arbitration award and to permit Appellant, C & A Enterprises, to 
pursue its cross-claim against Otto Buehner & Company. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 12, 1984, the District Court for Weber County 
confirmed an arbitration award in favor of Appellee, Worthington & 
Kimball Construction Co. Record at pp. 160-161. Said Appellee 
had moved to confirm the award (Record at 41-43) within the time 
provided by statute. The motion had been opposed by Appellants 
who also moved the court to vacate the award. Record at 69-70. 
Trial was held with respect to additional claims of the parties 
which were not concluded by confirmation of the arbitration award. 
The trial resulted in the Corrected Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (Record at 1116-1137) and a Corrected Order, 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (Record at 1108-1115) on April 
18, 1985. 
The arbitration award provided for "interest'1 to 
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. (referred to as 
the contractor in the award) at fifteen percent (15%) from 
December 1, 1982• Record at 48-49, paragraph 7. The District 
Court refused to enforce the fifteen percent (15%) "interest" 
award made by the arbitrators because it found that that portion 
of the award, while denominated by the arbitrators as "interest", 
was apparently intended as a penalty. Record at 722 and 1130, 
paragraph 33. The District Court therefore granted Appellee, 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., interest at the rate of 
ten percent (10%) per annum on their Judgment against Appellants. 
Record at 1109-1110, paragraph 1. 
The arbitrators had specified in the award that the 
fifteen percent (15%) "interest" was in part a measure of damages 
to Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. for the unreasonable 
withholding of the balance of the contract price. Record at 
48-49, paragraph 7. The District Court's determination that the 
"interest" was in fact a penalty was based on the language of the 
award itself. Record.at 1227, lines 8-9. 
By its terms, the arbitration award was not payable by 
Appellants (referred to as the owner in the award) until Appellee, 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., filed with the American 
Arbitration Association lien waivers from the contractor and all 
its subcontractors. Record at 49, paragraph 9. The contract 
between Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. and C & A 
Development Co. ("Contract") specifies with respect to the date 
payments are due thereunder: 
11.7 No payment shall be made under Article 11 
unless Contractor shall have attached to the 
Application for Payment Lien Waivers, from 
Contractor and Sub-Contractors, as the Owner and 
Interim Lender shall require. 
Record at 60. It further indicates with respect to the final 
payment: 
11.5 Before issuance of Final Payment, the 
Contractor shall submit satisfactory evidence that 
all payrolls, materials bills and other indebtedness 
connected with the Project have been paid or 
otherwise satisfied. 
Record at 60. 
Under the Contract, interest was payable on payments due 
but unpaid "provided Contractor shall have timely furnished Owner 
all documentation required for such payment." Record at 60, 
paragraph 11.1.4. The arbitrators had indicated to the parties that 
they believed that any award to Appellee, Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Co., should be conditioned upon delivery of lien 
waivers or release. Record at 97, paragraph 8. The District Court 
did not find nor does the record reflect that lien waivers were ever 
provided. 
In a letter specifying issues the arbitrators wished the 
parties to address in their post-hearing briefs, the arbitrators 
indicated they were considering imposing a penalty. Among the 
questions they asked the parties to address were: 
4.a. Did C & A withhold an unreasonable amount 
on contractor's request for final payment? 
b. If so, what penalty, if any, should be 
assessed against C & A? 
Record at 96. 
With respect to arbitration, the Contract provides: 
16.1 All claims, disputes and other matters in 
questions arising out of or relating to this 
agreement or the breach thereof, except with respect 
to the Architects/Engineers decision on matters 
relating to an artistic effect, and except for claims 
which have been waived by the making or acceptance of 
Final Payment shall be decided by arbitration in 
accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration 
Rules of the American Arbitration Association then 
obtaining unless the parties mutually agree 
otherwise. . . . 
16.4 Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the 
Contractor shall carry on the Work and maintain the 
Contract Time Schedule during any arbitration 
proceedings and the Owner shall continue to make 
payments in accordance with this Agreement 
Record at 65-66. 
The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules referred to in 
paragraph 16.1 of the Contract provide with respect to the scope of 
an award made pursuant thereto: 
The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief 
which is just and equitable and within the terms of 
the agreement of the parties. . . . 
Record at 82, Rule 43. 
The arbitrators stated in the award that the arbitration 
was "to resolve disputes between the parties arising out of the 
performance and interruption of a contract . . . for the design and 
construction of a factory building . . . . " Record at 44. The 
arbitrators awarded Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Co,, "the unpaid balance of the contract price as adjusted by change 
orders • . • subject to such deductions therefrom as the arbitrators 
find to be warranted under the terms of the contract and the 
evidence received with respect to the claims of the owner." Record 
at 47, paragraph 4. Among the reasons stated for denial of other 
claims of the owner are: 
a. Not the responsibility of the contractor; 
c. Not authorized by or barred by the terms of the 
contract between the parties, including the plans and 
specifications; 
e. Not included within the scope of work to be 
performed by the contractor;. . . . 
Record at 48, paragraph 6. Among the reasons given by the 
Arbitrators for denial of other claims of the contractor are: 
a. Not the responsibility of the owner; 
c. Not authorized by the contract or barred by the 
terms of the contract, including the plans and 
specifications; 
d. Already covered in change orders executed by 
owner and contractor; . . . . 
Record at 49, paragraph 8. 
With the exception of the reference to a penalty, all of 
the issues which the arbitrators requested the parties to consider 
in the post-hearing briefs dealt with claims grounded in the 
contract between the parties. Record at 95-98. 
Seventeen days of hearings were held in connection with 
the arbitration. Record at 44. At the close of the hearings, 
counsel for Appellants and counsel for the Appellee, Worthington & 
Kimball Construction Co., both indicated that they had no further 
witnesses. Record at 131, line 18 through 132, line 8. The 
arbitrators and the parties had previously agreed on dates for 
submission of briefs and reply briefs, (Record at 130) and agreed 
that the arbitrators would meet thereafter and declare the hearings 
closed, (Record at 132, line 14-133, line 1). The hearings were 
closed by the arbitrators September 2, 1983 and an award was to be 
made on or before October 2, 1983. Record at 83-84. 
On August 30, 1983, after the evidence taking portion of 
the hearing had concluded and the time for filing briefs had passed, 
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., moved to reopen 
the hearing. Record at 85-88. Appellants had argued in their 
arbitration reply brief that no claim had been established against 
two of the respondents in the arbitration, C & A Enterprises and 
C & A Companies, Inc. Record at 85, 89-91. 
In its motion to reopen the hearings, Appellee, 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., claimed assignment of the 
Contract by C & A Development Co. to C & A Enterprises, but did not 
cite testimony in the arbitration of any assignment or consent 
thereto nor did it refer the arbitrators to an assignment of the 
contract or a consent thereto which had been made an exhibit to the 
arbitration. Record at 85, numbered paragraph 1 and 2. Appellee, 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., by its motion, supplemented 
its briefs by proposing theories upon which the joint and several 
liability of all the arbitration respondents could be based. Record 
at 85-88. 
With respect to presentation of evidence, the Construction 
Industry Arbitration Rules specified by the Contract provide in 
part: 
All evidence shall be taken in the presence of all of 
the arbitrators and all of the parties, except where 
any of the parties is absent in default or has waived 
his or her right to be present. 
Record at 81, Rule 31. 
There is no evidence in the record of any default by Appellants or 
either of them at the time the motion to reopen the hearings was 
submitted nor of any waiver of the right to be present at such time. 
The arbitration hearings were reopened (Record at 92) over 
the objection of Appellants, (Record at 89-91). An additional 
hearing was noticed for the purpose of taking additional evidence 
regarding the claims of Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction 
Co., Record at 93. Appellants objected to the hearing and to any 
proceedings which permitted Appellee, Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Co., to further support its claims without also 
permitting Appellants to present additional evidence in support of 
their claims. Record at 94. When the hearing was held despite 
their objection, Appellants stipulated that the Contract had been 
assigned by Appellants, C & A Development Co., to Appellant, C & A 
Enterprises. Record at 45. 
Appellee asserted in its motion to reopen the hearings 
that reopening the hearings should not delay making the award. 
Record at 88. No award was made as of October 2, 1983, the date 
thirty days from close of the hearings set for making the award* 
Record at 83-84. The award was not made until November 7, 1983. 
Record at 50. 
The Contract does not fix a date by which any arbitration 
award must be made thereunder. Record at 51-66. It does provide 
that the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association apply unless the parties otherwise agree. 
Record at 65-66, paragraph 16.1. The record does not reflect any 
other agreement by the parties regarding the time for making an 
arbitration award. 
The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules provide with 
respect to time for making an award: 
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator 
and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or 
specified by law, not later than thirty days from the 
date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings 
have been waved, from the date of transmitting the 
final statements and proofs to the arbitrator. 
Record at 82, Rule 41. 
There is no evidence in the record of any agreement by the 
parties for extension of the time for making the award. The 
Construction Industry Arbitration rules provide: 
The hearings may be reopened by the arbitrator at 
will, or upon application of a party at any time 
before the award is made. If the reopening of the 
hearing would prevent the making of the award within 
the specific time agreed upon by the parties in the 
contract out of which the controversy has arisen, the 
matter may not be reopened unless the parties agree 
upon the extension of such time limit. When no 
specific date is fixed in the contract, the 
arbitrator may reopen the hearings, and the 
arbitrator shall have thirty days from the closing of 
the reopened hearing within which to make an award. 
The District Court ruled that Appellant, C & A Enterprises 
were barred by collateral estoppel from maintaining its cross-claim 
(Record at 307-315) against Otto Buehner & Company for negligence. 
Record at 44. Otto Buehner & Company was not a party to the 
contract or the arbitration. Record at 711-713. The contract 
provides: 
4c3 No contractual relationship shall exist between 
the Owner and any Subcontractor and the Contractor 
shall be responsible for the management of the 
Subcontractors in the performance of their Work. 
Record at 55. 
The confirmation of the arbitration award (Record at 
160-161) and the Order and Judgment signed by the District Court in 
connection therewith (Record at 166-167) did not adjudicate all the 
claims, rights or liabilities of all the parties to the action. 
Retrial Order, Record at 726 et seq. The District Court did not 
make a determination that there was no just reason for delay or 
direct entry of judgment confirm in the award. Record at 166-167. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
The District Court erred in refusing to vacate the 
arbitration award although it found that the award included an 
improper penalty which the court would not enforce. 
II. 
The District Court erred in failing to vacate the 
arbitration award which was not made within the time required and 
with respect to which the arbitrators improperly reopened the 
hearing. 
III. 
The District Court erred in ruling that the claims of 
Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto Buehner & 
Company are barred by collateral estoppel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The District Court erred in refusing to vacate 
the award although it found that the award included an improper 
penalty which the court would not enforce. 
This court has recognized the public policy in favor of 
arbitration. Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 
1070 (Utah 1981). The Court has noted that arbitration is a 
practical and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing 
court congestion. Robinson and Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1983). However, the legislature has enacted statutes which 
govern the arbitrability of claims, the procedure to be followed and 
the court's powers and responsibilities with respect thereto. Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-1 through 78-31-22. This court 
has recognized that judicial authority with respect to arbitration 
is limited by statute. Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, supra at 
p. 846. In fact, the court has stated that judicial review of 
arbitration awards "should be strictly limited to statutory grounds 
and procedures for review." Id. Clearly, the function of the court 
is to consider the award and the arbitration in accordance with the 
statutes. 
When the District Court found that the arbitration award 
included an improper penalty, it should have vacated the award 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16 rather than 
confirming the award but refusing to grant a judgment which enforced 
the offending provision. 
The District Court found that the award on its face 
included a penalty. Record at 1227, lines 8-9. The award which by 
its terms was not yet payable included "interest" as a measure of 
damages for unreasonable withholding of the balance of contract 
price. Punitive damages are not appropriate damages for contract 
claims. Highland Construction Company v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, 683 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1984), Jorgensen v. John Clay and 
Company, 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983). 
As indicated in the award, the arbitrators perceived their 
responsibility was to resolve disputes arising out of the 
performance and interpretation of the contract. Except for the 
"interest" found by the District Court to be a penalty, the award 
clearly evaluates the claims and defenses of the parties based upon 
the Contract. The amount of the award is the amount due under the 
Contract as adjusted by change orders and reduced by the contractual 
claims of Appellants. Many of the other claims of Appellants and of 
the Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., were disposed 
of by the arbitrators by reference to the terms of the Contract 
between them. Clearly, the arbitrable claims were those sounding in 
contract. 
Even if the court looked beyond the four corners of the 
arbitration award, it would have properly concluded that only 
contractual damages were to be included in the award. The rules 
agreed upon by the contracting parties provided that the scope of 
award was limited to remedies and relief "within the terms of the 
agreement of the parties11. Record at 82, Rule 43. There is no 
provision in the Contract for assessment of any penalty from a 
party. 
There was sufficient evidence beyond the face of the award 
to support the District Court's finding that the "interest" which 
the arbitrators awarded was not intended to compensate the 
Contractor but was intended as a penalty. No interest was payable 
by the terms of the Contract until all documentation required for 
payment was furnished to the Owner. Among the documentation 
required was lien waivers from the contractor and subcontractors. 
Payments were not due until these documents had been provided. The 
final payment was not due until satisfactory evidence that all 
payrolls, material bills and other indebtedness connected with the 
project had been paid or otherwise satisfied. The arbitrators 
recognixed the contractual requirement of supplying these documents 
prior to payment and provided in the award that the award was not 
payable and would not be until lien waivers were provided. There is 
no evidence in the record that the required lien waivers were ever 
obtained or provided, nor that other evidence that payrolls, 
materials bills and other indebtedness connected with the project 
had been paid or satisfied was supplied. The arbitrators had 
indicated to the parties that they felt that any award to Appellee, 
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. should be conditioned upon 
delivery of lien waivers or release of liens. 
Since lien waivers had not been provided, the final 
payment was not due; no interest was accruing thereon under the 
Contract. Thus, the withholding of the final payment was not 
wrongful or malicious and would not have supported a claim grounded 
in tort for which punitive or exemplary damages could be awarded had 
the claim been brought in a judicial forum rather than in 
arbitration. Jorgensen v. John Clay and Company, 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 
1983). 
Since the "interest" awarded was not intended as 
compensatory damages but was a measure of damages for "unreasonable 
withholding", it was punitive. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, 
Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983). However, in a private 
proceeding such as an arbitration, punitive damages do not serve 
societal interests. Arbitrators who are called upon to resolve 
contractual disputes and make awards within the terms of the 
parties' agreement derive their authority from the agreement and 
statute and, absent agreement by the parties or statutory authority, 
have no power to award punitive damages. One court has even held 
that an arbitration award of punitive damages violates public policy 
and is improper even if the parties provided in their arbitration 
agreement that punitive damages may be awarded. Garrity v. Lyle 
Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 
(1976). 
Having determined that the "interest" was an improper 
measure of damages and could not be enforced, the District Court 
should have vacated the award. The District Court had found that 
the arbitrators had exceeded their authority. Such a finding 
requires that the award be vacated when a party to the arbitration 
has properly so moved. Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16. 
The District Court could not modify the award pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-17. The District Court is 
empowered to modify an award only upon application of a party. No 
such application had been made. The statute does not grant the 
District Court authority to modify the award on its own motion. 
Without arrogating to itself powers which the legislature did not 
grant, the District Court could not modify the award. 
Even if a party had made application for modification or 
the District Court had authority to modify the award on its own 
motion, a modification excising the improper damages would not have 
been appropriate. The statute provides that Mthe order must modify 
and correct the award so as to effect the intent thereof." Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-17. The District Court had 
already determined that the intent of the arbitrators in awarding a 
penalty was improper. It could not make an order giving effect to 
that intent. The award could not be modified in accordance with the 
statute which strictly limits the District Court's authority. 
The District Court was required to either confirm or 
vacate the award. Because it found that the award included an 
improper measure of damages which the court could not enforce, the 
arbitration fell within the scope of Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Section 78-31-16. The arbitrators had exceeded their authority. 
The statute required the District Court to vacate the award. Under 
the statute, the Court had no authority to confirm the balance of 
the award. 
POINT II. The District Court erred in failing to vacate 
the arbitration award which was not made within the time required 
and with respect to which the arbitrators improperly reopened the 
hearing. 
The award was made after the time set forth in the letter 
of the American Arbitration Association for making the award had 
lapsed. There was no agreement of the parties to extend that time. 
There was no waiver by Appellants of the requirement that an award 
be made within the time specified. The arbitrators derive their 
authority from the partiesf agreement and statute and have no power 
to make an award after the time provided in the agreement or statute 
for making the award has lapsed. General Metals Corp. v. Precision 
Lodge 1600, 183 Cal. App.2d 586, 6 Cal. Rtpr. 910 (1960). 
Appellee argued below that the time was extended by 
reopening of the hearings. Appellee asserted that no specific date 
for making the award was fixed in the Contract and consequently, the 
third sentence of Rule 36 of the Construction Industry Arbitration 
Rules (Record at 81) extends the time for making the award. The 
language of the third sentence of Rule 36 indicates that it is not 
intended to apply to agreements to arbitrate future disputes• With 
few exceptions, no specific date is set forth in any contract 
relating to the submission to arbitration of potential future 
disputes. The parties to a contract have no way of knowing when a 
dispute will arise, when arbitration would be demanded, or how long 
a proceeding to resolve an unknown dispute could be expected to 
take. In the absence of such foreknowledge, attempting to fix a 
specific date by which an award must be made is meaningless. 
However, the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules are designed to 
cover agreements to submit existing disputes to arbitration as well 
as agreements relating to future disputes. The third sentence of 
Rule 36 is designed to control with respect to agreements to submit 
existing disputes to arbitration. The parties can, if they choose, 
agree on a specific date by which the award must be made with 
respect to a known, existing dispute. 
With respect to agreements to submit future disputes, the 
second sentence of Rule 36 controls. That sentence provides: 
If the reopening of the hearing would prevent 
the making of the award within the specific time 
agreed upon by the parties in the contract out of 
which the controversy has arisen, the matter may not 
be reopened, unless the parties agree upon the 
extension of such time limit. 
It is clear that either a time for the award was agreed 
upon by the parties in the contract or they failed to set a time. 
It is also clear that there was no agreement to extend the time. 
If the parties did agree upon a time, that time was thirty days from 
the close of the hearings as indicated by Rule 41 of the 
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules (Record at 82) which the 
parties agreed would apply (Record at 65-66, paragraph 16.1) and by 
the letter of the American Arbitration Association which stated that 
an ward would be due within thirty days of the close of the hearings 
(Record at 83-84). 
No award was made within that time as a result of the 
reopening the hearing. No extension of the time was agreed upon by 
the parties. Therefore, reopening the hearings was improper. The 
time for making an award having lapsed, the arbitrators had no 
authority to make the award. The District Court should have vacated 
the award. 
If the parties failed in their agreement to set a time 
within which the award must be made, the Utah Statutes set a time 
limit. Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-8 provides: 
Award-Time for Making.- If the time within which the 
award shall be made is not fixed in the arbitration 
agreement, the award must be made within sixty (60) 
days from the time of the appointment of the 
arbitrators, and an award made after the lapse of 
sixty (60) days shall have no legal effect, unless 
the parties extend the time in which said award may 
be made, which extension, or any ratification, shall 
be in writing. 
The date of appointment of the arbitrators does not appear 
in the record but that appointment certainly occurred before the 
first hearings were held on April 25, 1983, (Record at 44), one 
hundred ninety-six (196) days before the award was made. More than 
sixty (60) days elapsed after the closing of the hearings on 
September 2, 1983 before the award was made. 
If the parties did not set a time limit for making the 
award, by statute the award, made more than sixty days from 
appointment of the arbitrators, has no legal effect. It should have 
been vacated by the District Court. 
Whether (1) the parties agreed upon a time for making the 
award and the rule applied or (2) the statute applied because they 
had failed to so agree, no award was made within the time required. 
No extension of time was agreed upon. The arbitrators had no power 
to make an award after the required time. They exceeded their power 
in making the award. The award has no legal effect and pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16, it must be vacated. 
The doctrine of waiver does not justify confirming an 
untimely award. There is no evidence in the record of any waiver by 
Appellants of their rights. They did not acquiesce to any 
proceedings after the time set forth in the letter of the American 
Arbitration Association for making the award. They objected to 
reopening the hearings, to submission of additional evidence and 
argument of new theories for recovery by Appellee, Worthington & 
Kimball Construction Co., after the taking of evidence had concluded 
and agreed upon briefs had been submitted, and objected to 
additional proceedings. 
Both the statute regarding time for making the award and 
the rule regarding reopening of the hearing require an affirmative 
act by both parties to extend the time. Refusal or failure by 
Appellants to make such an affirmative act does not constitute a 
waiver. Nor does it evidence an intent to waive. Rather, it 
evidences the unwillingness of Appellants to agree to extend the 
time. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court, interpreting a statute 
similar to Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-8, held that 
because written agreement is required to extend the time for making 
the award, waiver is precluded by the statute. Marsala v. Valve 
Corporation of America, 157 Conn. 362, 254 A.2d 469 (1969). There 
was in that case no waiver despite participation in and failure to 
object to proceedings after the time fixed by the statute had 
lapsed. 
While public policy favors resolving disputes by 
arbitration, the arbitration must conform to the agreement of the 
parties. Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co.,636 P.2d 1070 
(Utah 1981). The Court cannot ignore the requirement of the statute 
or of the rule which the parties agreed would control, one of which 
must apply. Nor should the Court construe the statute or rule to 
require a party to take some action to avoid waiver of a time limit 
when both the statute and rule specify that the time limit applies 
unless there is an express agreement to the contrary. 
The finding of a waiver would not do justice to the 
parties. Appellants were not responsible for the delay in making 
the award. They argued in their arbitration reply brief that 
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co*, had not 
established a claim against Appellant, C & A Enterprises and C & A 
Companies, Inc., another respondent in the arbitration. It was not 
Appellants burden at any time during the arbitration proceedings to 
remind Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., that it 
would be necessary to establish a case against each arbitration 
respondent which it desired to be bound by an award. Appellants did 
not raise a new issue by arguing the failure to establish a claim. 
The issue existed from the moment Appellee, Worthington & Kimball 
Construction Co., named those parties as respondents in the 
arbitration. Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., in 
its motion to reopen the hearings, argued new theories for recovery 
and facts not then in evidence. All this occurred after it had 
concluded its case and stated it had no further witnesses and after 
the time agreed upon by the parties and directed by the arbitrators 
for all briefs to be filed had passed. If there was any waiver, 
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., waived its right 
to prove a case against Appellant, C & A Enterprises and C & A 
Companies, Inc. in the arbitration proceeding by waiting until the 
hearings were to close to prove its claims against such parties. 
No award was made within the time established by statute 
or agreed upon rules, whichever applies. There was no agreement to 
extend the time for making the award as required under the statute 
or rules. Rather, Appellants objected to reopening of the hearings, 
and to additional proceedings which were held. There is no basis 
for finding that Appellants waived their rights to insist upon an 
award within the required time. Instead, if there was a waiver, it 
was Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., that waived 
its right to prove claims it omitted until after all evidence and 
briefs had been submitted. Any award made by the arbitrators was 
made after the time for making the award had passed. The 
arbitrators had no power after the time had lapsed and thus exceeded 
their powers. The District Court should have vacated the award. 
POINT III. The District Court erred in ruling that the 
claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto 
Buehner & Company, are barred by collateral estoppel. 
This Court has discussed the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel in International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 
1979). In that case, the Court stated that in order for collateral 
estoppel to apply, there must be (1) a final judgment on the merits 
and (2) an actual determination of the issues. Neither of the two 
requirements is met in this case. 
The only judgment which existed upon which collateral 
estoppel could be based was the Order and Judgment which confirmed 
the arbitration award. However, that judgment issued in this same 
case was not a final judgment. Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, an order, however denominated, which adjudicates 
fewer than all the issues or the rights and liabilities if fewer 
than all the parties is not final unless the court makes a 
determination that there is no just reason for delay and directs 
entry of judgment. More than one claim for relief had been 
presented in this case. Multiple parties were involved. The 
judgment confirming the arbitration award did not adjudicate all the 
claims presented nor did it adjudicate the rights and liabilities of 
all the parties. The claims remaining to be decided are described 
in the pretrial order. 
While it might have done so under Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court did not determine that 
there was no just reason for delay or direct entry of judgment. As 
a result, the judgment was "subject to revision at any time before 
the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties", Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
54(b). The order was in fact modified by the District Court as it 
refused to give effect in the Corrected Order, Judgment and Decree 
of Foreclosure to the fifteen percent (15%) "interest" provided in 
the arbitration award. 
Since there was no final judgment, collateral estoppel 
could not bar Appellants1 claims against Appellee, Otto Buehner & 
Co. 
There was not an actual determination of the issues raised 
by the crossclaim of C & A Enterprises. The arbitration award is 
binding only to persons who are parties to the arbitration and only 
as to subject matter submitted to the arbitrators. Patrick J. 
Ruane, Inc. v. Parker, 185 Cal.App.2d 488, 8 Cal.Rptr. 379 (1960); 
Geo. V. Nolte & Co. v. Pieler Construction Co., 337 P.2d 710 (Wash* 
1959); Hosek MFG-Overland Foundry Co. v. Teats, 110 P.2d 976 (Colo. 
1941). 
Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, was not a party to the 
arbitration. It was not a party to the contract which was the 
subject of the arbitration. There was no agreement between 
Appellant, C & A Enterprises, and Appellee, Otto Buehner & Co. to 
arbitrate claims existing between them. While public policy favors 
arbitration, the Court has recognized that a person cannot be 
compelled to arbitrate claims which he has not agreed to arbitrate. 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-1; Lindon City v. Engineers 
Construction Co., supra. Similarly, arbitrators cannot make binding 
decisions regarding matters not submitted to them. Even if the 
award purported to resolve claims between Appellant, 
C & A Enterprises, and Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, it would to 
that extent be ineffective. 
The claims of C & A Enterprises against Otto Buehner & 
Company were claims based on negligence. The arbitrators only 
considered the contractual claims of the parties to the Contract. 
They did not consider common law claims for negligence arising out 
of the work performed by Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, or its 
failure to exercise due care in connection therewith. 
There was no final judgment which actually determined the 
claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto 
Buehner & Company. The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not 
apply. The District Court erred in refusing to permit C & A 
Enterprises to prove such claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The arbitration award should have been vacated. The 
arbitrators exceeded their powers by including in the award a 
measure of damages which the District Court held to be improper and 
which it refused to enforce. That the ,finterest,f was not 
compensatory damages was evident from the face of the award and is 
supported by evidence beyond the award itself which indicates that 
actual interest was not payable under the contract and the 
arbitrators intent was to impose a penalty which was not within the 
parties' agreement and was not within the arbitrators1 authority. 
The arbitrators further exceed their power by making an 
award after the time for making an award had lapsed. Whether the 
time for making an award was set by agreement of the parties or by 
statute, the award was not timely made. Arbitrators only have power 
to the extent authority is granted by an agreement of the parties or 
by statute. After the time for making the award had lapsed, the 
arbitrators had no further power to make an award. 
The District Court should have vacated the award. This 
court must reverse the judgment confirming the award and remand this 
case to the District Court with instructions to vacate the 
arbitration award. 
Collateral estoppel did not apply to the claims of 
Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto Buehner & 
Company. There was no final judgment which determined the issues 
with respect to such claims. Appellant, C & A Enterprises, was 
improperly barred from submitting evidence to prove such claims. 
The decision of the District Court that collateral estoppel applied 
must be reversed and the case remanded to permit Appellant, C & A 
Enterprises, to pursue its claims. 
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of August, 1985. 
Robert F. Bentley 
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